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On the Arithmetical Truth of Self‐Referential Sentences
Theoria 85 (1):8-17 (2019)
Abstract
We take an argument of Gödel's from his ground‐breaking 1931 paper, generalize it, and examine its validity. The argument in question is this: "the sentence G says about itself that it is not provable, and G is indeed not provable; therefore, G is true".Author Profiles
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Citations of this work
There May Be Many Arithmetical Gödel Sentences.Kaave Lajevardi & Saeed Salehi - 2021 - Philosophia Mathematica 29 (2):278–287.
On a Fallacy Concerning I-Am-Unprovable Sentences: Reflections on Gödel's Introduction.Kaave Lajevardi & Saeed Salehi - forthcoming - History and Philosophy of Logic.
On a certain fallacy concerning I-am-unprovable sentences.Kaave Lajevardi & Saeed Salehi - manuscript
What he could have said (but did not say) about Gödel’s second theorem: A note on Floyd-Putnam’s Wittgenstein.Kaave Lajevardi - 2021 - Wittgenstein-Studien 12 (1):121-129.
References found in this work
Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I.K. Godel - 1931 - Monatshefte für Mathematik 38 (1):173--198.
Self-reference in arithmetic I.Volker Halbach & Albert Visser - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (4):671-691.
On the philosophical relevance of Gödel's incompleteness theorems.Panu Raatikainen - 2005 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 59 (4):513-534.
Self-Reference in Arithmetic II.Volker Halbach & Albert Visser - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (4):692-712.
On “seeing” the truth of the Gödel sentence.George Boolos - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):655-656.
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