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A general framework for explaining the results of a multi-attribute preference model
Artificial Intelligence 175 (7-8):1410-1448 (2011)
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Citations of this work
Explaining robust additive utility models by sequences of preference swaps.K. Belahcene, C. Labreuche, N. Maudet, V. Mousseau & W. Ouerdane - 2017 - Theory and Decision 82 (2):151-183.
A formal framework for deliberated judgment.Olivier Cailloux & Yves Meinard - 2020 - Theory and Decision 88 (2):269-295.
A reward-based approach for preference modeling: A case study.Eva Armengol & Josep Puyol-Gruart - 2017 - Journal of Applied Logic 23 (C):51-69.
References found in this work
On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games.Phan Minh Dung - 1995 - Artificial Intelligence 77 (2):321-357.
Reasoning about preferences in argumentation frameworks.Sanjay Modgil - 2009 - Artificial Intelligence 173 (9-10):901-934.
Using arguments for making and explaining decisions.Leila Amgoud & Henri Prade - 2009 - Artificial Intelligence 173 (3-4):413-436.
Generating and evaluating evaluative arguments.Giuseppe Carenini & Johanna D. Moore - 2006 - Artificial Intelligence 170 (11):925-952.
Qualitative decision theory with preference relations and comparative uncertainty: An axiomatic approach.Didier Dubois, Hélène Fargier & Patrice Perny - 2003 - Artificial Intelligence 148 (1-2):219-260.
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