Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Nishida Kitarō’s philosophy provides a new perspective on the nature of philosophy and phenomenology by its radical reflection on the phenomenon of self-awareness. As an active philosopher in the early 20th century, Nishida critically commented on Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. In what follows, I explicate Nishida’s critique of Husserl regarding the pursuit of the “consciousizing consciousness” and its relationship to the phenomenon of self-awareness. Subsequently I respond to Nishida’s critique on behalf of Husserl and phenomenologists by appealing to the general approach of a non-objectified self-awareness. However, I argue that such responses are insufficient, for Nishida is inquiring into the ground of Husserl’s phenomenological method, that is, how is phenomenological reflection possible? Insofar as phenomenological philosophy is a kind of reflective, rational self-awareness that consciousness has of itself, the phenomenological method itself cannot be based on a pre-reflective self-awareness, and Husserl’s phenomenology still remains vulnerable to Nishida’s critique. In this way, Nishida is performing a transcendental (self-)critique of transcendental phenomenology. The aim of this paper is to (1) explicate Nishida’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenological method, (2) evaluate its validity and (3) allude to how Nishida’s positive views on self-consciousness emerge from the problem of reflective self-awareness in Husserl.