Moral facts and the centrality of intuitions

In Jill Graper Hernandez, The New Intuitionism. London: Continuum. pp. 48--66 (2011)
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Christopher Kulp
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The Moral Closure Argument.Matt Lutz - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 19 (1):80-110.

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