Abstract

Attempts to solve philosophical problems from the point of view of language-use has been very fruitful, but if language becomes the sole principle by which knowledge is accounted for, serious strains emerge. This article ventures to criticize the conception of historical knowledge as being — for any part of it that is more than the statement of simple fact — essentially the product of the creative powers of language. This argument is developed by analysing the work of two philosophers, Michel Foucault and Hayden White, who both hold that our image of the past is the result of the aesthetic and creative power of language : although they share a common starting point in aestheticism, Foucault and White are at odds over central issues in their theories. As a consequence we can read the philosophy of the one as a criticism of the philosophy of the other. Such a reading unveils the paradoxical structure inherent in aestheticism. In his early philosophical work, White argues that we can free ourselves from the „burden of history“ by the insight that we are not so much conditioned by our past-asit-really-was, but the past as we chose to order it. The meaning of history is the result of „emplotment", „formal argument“ and „ideological implication“. These three levels of narrative order are themselves the result of one of the four basic tropes which „prefigure the historical field“. Now that White has revealed to us the way in which historians unconsciously gave meaning to history, we are free to do so consciously. Foucault's Les mots et les choses starts with the same idea that the order of things is determined by the deeper structure of language. His history of the épistèmè, the fundamental code of culture, shows a striking resemblance to White's theory of tropes. But there are dramatic differences as well. For example the épistèmè of modernity — corresponding to White's trope of irony — is criticized by Foucault for being unstable, since it wants to free man by gaining insight into the way he is bound by nature and culture. This is of course self-defeating. Foucault holds that man is only a recent invention, the necessary consequence of irony. Once we understand him as the result of the modern épistèmè, we will experience his gradual disappearance. In this article I agree with Foucault that White's humanistic optimism is ill-founded.How can the unveiling of the tropological ground of the meaning of history be anything else than irony ? We lost the freedom to choose a trope and are bound to irony, skepticism and cynicism. Although White never gave a refutation of this criticism, he did develop a strong critique of Foucault's philosophy. Foucault's alternative to humanism, the disappearance of man, is based on his image of western history as a series of changes in épistèmè's that lacks rhyme or reason. His history claims no meaning at all, it is just„ one damned thing after another". White convincingly shows that this is untrue, when he argues that Foucault's development of épistèmè's conforms the order of tropes, which is a logical process, starting in a naive conception of the world and ending in criticalself-consciousness. Foucault's philosophy does not announce the end of man but rather, paradoxically, is an unconscious example of self-consciousness. Both Foucault and White attempt to overcome these strains in their theories by radicalizing their standpoints. Both point to power as the most basic principle at work in language.White argues that in our culture history is written as a device of power to discipline people into believing that history has a meaning and into behaving themselves accordingly. However our most basic experience makes us aware that history in itself is totally different from the images created in narratives, since history is inherently meaningless, bitterness and death. White describes this as „ the sublime ' '. But to what type of freedom are we lead by this insight into the deep truth ? The only logical reaction is a radical revolt against existence itself. White advises us to return to our narratives of old and denounce the sublime. But is that possible? Is not the truth of the sublime experience the basis of aestheticism ? It is the same old paradox of irony which holds us captive. Foucault presents basically the same conception of power and knowledge as White, but rejects his leap into humanism and narrative as impossible. White claims that beyond power and language there is a sublime experience of history, and it is this experience which both proves the truth of aestheticism — our narrative knowledge does not stem from reality but from language — and makes us flee to these narratives. Foucault's anti-narrative conception of history, as a set of meaningless changes in power, conforms itself to the sublime but never claims to be anything else than the product of power. Once we have accepted the idea that power is the source of culture there is no way out of the sublime. White however points out that Foucault's conception of history is itself the product of the trope catachresis, is itself a narrative, and hence we can, and should, reject it. No doubt White is right : we should reject the dramatic consequences of aestheticism, irony, and the sublime. No doubt Foucault is right as well. Irony and the sublime are the heart of aestheticism, which therefore cannot be given up by anyone who starts his reflections on history and knowledge based on the conception of knowledge as the product of language, and language as a tool of power