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Knowledge needs no justification
In Quentin Smith, Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press. pp. 5--23 (2008)
Abstract
The Standard View in epistemology is that knowledge is justified, true belief plus something else. This chapter argues that Standard View should be rejected: knowledge does not require justification. The nature of knowledge and the nature of justification can be better understood if we stop viewing justification as one of the necessary conditions for knowledge.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification.George S. Pappas - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):190-222.
Theorizing about the epistemic.Stewart Cohen - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):839-857.
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