Abstract

This chapter picks up where the previous one left off. I first explore in more detail how the notion of the umwelt from enactivism can undergird the distinction between the world for us and the world in itself that informs PE, such that these ideas can provide a cogent alternative subject naturalistic grounding for ARTL to GE. I then take up various matters arising from the various discussions of Chap. 3 and Sect. 4.2. Firstly, I explain how two varieties of (non-classical) representationalist cognitive can also be seen as conducive to or compatible with PE, taking up amongst other things the recently popular predictive processing model of cognition. Secondly, I give an overview of various outstanding issues concerning the notions of content, information, concepts and knowledge, and the role they can play in my enactivist-based version of ARTL. Lastly, I clarify in what way and to what extent my version of ARTL differs from Price’s, amongst other things focussing on his concept of e-representation.