An Epistemic Case for Positive Voting Duties

Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 33 (1):74-101 (2021)
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Abstract

In response to widespread voter ignorance, Jason Brennan argues for a voting ethics that can be summarized as one negative duty: do not vote badly. The implication that abstaining is always permissible entails no incentive for citizens to become competent voters or to vote once competent. Following the Condorcet Jury Theorem, this can lead to suboptimal outcomes, suggesting that voter turnout should concern instrumentalist epistemic accounts of democratic legitimacy. This could be addressed by adding two positive voting duties: to make an effort to become a competent voter; and, once competent, to vote.

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Carline Klijnman
University College Dublin

Citations of this work

Voting, Representation, and Institutions: A Critique of Elliott’s Duty to Vote.Ben Saunders - 2025 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 29 (2):315-322.

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References found in this work

Famine, Affluence, and Morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Oxford University Press USA.
Famine, affluence, and morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.
Against Democracy: New Preface.Jason Brennan - 2016 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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