When infinite regresses are not vicious

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718–729 (2003)
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Abstract

I will argue for two main points. First, the regress imbedded in infinitism need not be subject to the Structural Objection; and second, the Structural Objection does not pose a real problem for any regress. I will not be arguing for the correctness of my proposal directly. That is, as will become apparent soon, my proposal rests on two principles of reasoning which together entail infinitism and I will not present my arguments for those principles here. The purpose of this paper is to show that the objections raised by Gillett do not pose a grave problem for infinitism.

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reprint Klein, Peter (2007) "When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(3):718-729

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Citations of this work

The Unity of Grounding.Selim Berker - 2017 - Mind 127 (507):729-777.
Viciousness and the structure of reality.Ricki Leigh Bliss - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):399-418.
What Work the Fundamental?Ricki Leigh Bliss - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):359-379.
Human knowledge and the infinite progress of reasoning.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.

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