Are we committed to a U-condition for blameworthiness?

In Determinism, Blameworthiness, and Deprivation. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 66-91 (1990)
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Abstract

This chapter argues that some of our reflective moral intuitions are ‘U-condition generating beliefs’, that is beliefs which commit those who hold them (whether they realize it or not) to the belief in a U-condition. These intuitions are all beliefs to the effect that agents are not morally responsible if their actions are caused by certain specific factors; what these factors have in common is that they are states or events for which the agents are not responsible.

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