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Sources of Knowledge: On the Concept of a Rational Capacity for Knowledge
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press (2017)
Abstract
How can human beings, who are liable to error, possess knowledge, since the grounds on which we believe do not rule out that we are wrong? Andrea Kern argues that we can disarm this skeptical doubt by conceiving knowledge as an act of a rational capacity. In this book, she develops a metaphysics of the mind as existing through knowledge of itself.Author's Profile
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Perception as a Rational CapacitySources of knowledge: On the concept of a rational capacity for knowledge, by Andrea Kern, translated by Daniel Smyth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017, 304 pp. ISBN 13: 9780674416116 hb £25.95. [REVIEW]Michael Williams - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):1168-1175.
"On Andrea Kern’s 'The Knowledge View of Perception'".Apaar Kumar - 2024 - In Ori Beck & Miloš Vuletić, Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 131-33.
Perception as a Rational Capacity.Andrea Giananti - 2024 - In Johannes Roessler, Andrea Giananti & Gianfranco Soldati, Perceptual Knowledge and Self-Awareness. Oxford United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the): Oxford University Press.
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Knowing Moral Truth: A Theory of Metaethics and Moral Knowledge.Christopher B. Kulp - 2017 - Lanham: Lexington Books.
Comment on A. Kern, “The Knowledge View of Perception”.David Sosa - 2024 - In Ori Beck & Miloš Vuletić, Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 139-140.
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Citations of this work
“I Am Not What I Am”: Mendelssohn and Cavell on Self-Alienation and the Stakes of Skepticism.Jens Pier - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.
Kant: constitutivism as capacities-first philosophy.Karl Schafer - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):177-193.
Formal Necessity – Kant's Hylomorphic Account of Laws of Nature.Mathis Koschel - 2026 - Synthese 207.
Kant on Method.Karl Schafer - 2024 - In Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes, Oxford Handbook of Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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