Abstract

Is it reasonable to believe in the existence of God given the kinds and amounts of evil we find in the world? In this thesis I consider the merits of the evidential argument from evil which claims, not that there is a logical contradiction between evil and the attributes of God, but that evil makes the existence of God unlikely. It is widely considered that debate has resulted in a standoff where neither side can prove its case. The cognitive limitations defense proposes that, given God's vastly superior knowledge compared to ours, we have no business thinking that he wouldn't have good reasons for allowing evil that we are too ignorant to fathom. I propose a number of ways for the atheist to meet this challenge. I appeal to an argument from justice to show that we do know of certain constraints on what can be a God-justifying reason and that these constraints require the theist to defend the existence of an afterlife. I appeal to the problem of God's silence with respect to suffering to show that the unknown reasons hypothesis is not the simplest explanation. I also point out the uncomfortable consequences for theism itself if we are as ignorant of the ways of God as the cognitive limitations defense would have us. I then move on to consider other possible responses to the evidential argument from evil. I deal with Alvin Plantinga's free will defense, Augustine's fall theodicy, John Hick's soul-making theodicy and Richard Swinburne's known goods theodicy among others. I conclude that no response will succeed unless it appeals to an afterlife where horrific earthly suffering is redeemed. I then show that there are good evidential grounds for thinking that there is no afterlife. The evidential argument from evil is thus vindicated. The theist is challenged to come up with positive reasons for believing in the existence of God that outweigh the evidence against God's existence provided by the evils we find in the world