Abstract

In the post-Saddam era, the scourge of sectarian conflict in its worst form looms large on the horizon of the entire Muslim world: an intra-civilizational clash may be rather more likely (and imminent) than an inter-civilizational one. Hence sectarian militancy, with its potential to be the future determinant of the course that Muslim politics takes, needs thorough investigation. Moreover, it needs to be addressed as a problem in itself, not merely as a part of another problem—it has mostly been treated as a side-effect of Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ and one of other causes of ‘terrorism’ in the name of religion. The questions addressed in this paper are therefore of vital importance. Why, of all places, did Jhang become a hotbed of such Shiʿa–Sunni? To understand the antecedents of sectarian militancy there, it is imperative to locate the causes embedded in its history, particularly the rise of Deobandi influence. That history is referred to here as providing clerics like Haq Nawaz Jhangvi with the rationale for pronouncing a verdict of kufr on Shiʿas. However, while addressing the Shiʿa-Sunni divide, this paper also looks closely at another factor—the rivalry between the two leading kinships in Jhang namely the Syeds and Sials. These competing kinships, as the sources reveal, deliberately exploited and aggravated the sectarian fault lines in Jhang for local political advantage. That rivalry lends acute complexity to the dynamics that underlie an explosive situation, and it merits the careful probing here attempted. Equally important to understanding sectarianism is the role of the migrants, who settled in Jhang after the time of partition. These local traders and bazaars merchants from East Punjab have wealth but no political clout, which they looked for through unequivocal support and funding for outfits like Sipah-i-Sahaba and Lashkar-i Jhangvi. Another important theme in the paper is the interface between sectarian and electoral politics.