Knowledge-Qua in Groups

Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 12 (2025)
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Abstract

Deflationism about group knowledge is the view that a group has knowledge if and only if most of its members have that knowledge. The case against deflationism has revolved around epistemic divergence arguments, which typically aim to show that members’ knowledge isn’t necessary for group knowledge. This paper is instead devoted to objections against members’ knowledge being sufficient for group knowledge. Focusing on structured groups in which members occupy roles that are connected by internal links in a social network, we develop a notion of knowledge qua such occupancy. We proceed to argue that if deflationists adopt such knowledge-qua as what constitutes structured group knowledge, they have the resources to counter worries about the sufficiency condition. If instead groups are taken to be feature collectives, then similar worries are much less pressing. Finally, we elaborate on the societal function of knowledge-qua, as well as the different epistemic assessments that arise, depending on whether the role or its occupant is considered.

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Jesper Kallestrup
University of Aberdeen

Citations of this work

When do groups have evidence?Jesper Kallestrup - 2026 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):1551-1568.

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References found in this work

The Epistemology of Groups.Jennifer Lackey - 2020 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
What is a (social) structural explanation?Sally Haslanger - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):113-130.

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