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Thurstonian and Brunswikian origins of uncertainty in judgment: A sampling model of confidence in sensory discrimination
Psychological Review 104 (2):344-366 (1997)
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Citations of this work
Two-stage dynamic signal detection: A theory of choice, decision time, and confidence.Timothy J. Pleskac & Jerome R. Busemeyer - 2010 - Psychological Review 117 (3):864-901.
The self-consistency model of subjective confidence.Asher Koriat - 2012 - Psychological Review 119 (1):80-113.
The interpretation of uncertainty in ecological rationality.Anastasia Kozyreva & Ralph Hertwig - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1517-1547.
PROBabilities from EXemplars (PROBEX): a “lazy” algorithm for probabilistic inference from generic knowledge.Peter Juslin & Magnus Persson - 2002 - Cognitive Science 26 (5):563-607.
Variance misperception explains illusions of confidence in simple perceptual decisions.Ariel Zylberberg, Pieter R. Roelfsema & Mariano Sigman - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 27:246-253.
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