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Are Qualia Just Representations? A Critical Notice of Michael Tye's Ten Problems of Consciousness
Mind and Language 12 (1):101-113 (1997)
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Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind.Michael Tye - 1995 - MIT Press.
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Citations of this work
Representationalism about Consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel, The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Conscious experience, reduction and identity: many explanatory gaps, one solution.Liam P. Dempsey - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):225-245.
References found in this work
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.
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