Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise

Metaphilosophy 34 (3):353-366 (2003)
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Abstract

This essay defends virtue reliabilism against a line of argument put forward by Duncan Pritchard. In the process, it discusses (1) the motivations for virtue reliabilism, (2) some analogies between epistemic virtue and moral virtue, and (3) the relation between virtue (epistemic and otherwise) and luck (epistemic and otherwise). It argues that considerations about virtue and luck suggest a solution to Gettier problems from the perspective of a virtue theory.

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John Greco
Georgetown University

Citations of this work

Anti-luck epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
Safety-Based Epistemology: Wither Now?Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:33-45.
A Modal Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck.Rik Peels - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (1):73-88.
Knowledge and Safety.Christoph Kelp - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:21-31.

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References found in this work

Warrant: The Current Debate.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York,: Oxford University Press USA.
Theory of knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 2000 - Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Knowledge as Credit for True Belief.John Greco - 2003 - In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski, Intellectual virtue: perspectives from ethics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 111-134.
Doing & Deserving; Essays in the Theory of Responsibility.Joel Feinberg - 1970 - Princeton, N.J.,: Princeton University Press.

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