When is a fallacy not a fallacy?

Metaphilosophy 19 (3‐4):307-312 (1988)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The informal fallacies can be conceived as enthymemes that are formally valid. But, then, what accounts for our sense of their fallaciousness? I explain this in terms of the notion of a warrant.

Other Versions

reprint Marks, Joel (2007) "When is a Fallacy Not a Fallacy?". Metaphilosophy 19(3‐4):307-312

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-10

Downloads
94 (#563,815)

6 months
6 (#1,505,551)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Joel Marks
University of New Haven

Citations of this work

The Case of the Missing Premise.Don S. Levi - 1995 - Informal Logic 17 (1).
An Informal Logic Bibliography.Hans V. Hansen - 1990 - Informal Logic 12 (3).

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references