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Hornsby and Baker on the physicalist orthodoxy
Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):188-192 (2000)
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Citations of this work
Jackson, Serious Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis.Alexander Miller - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):574-587.
References found in this work
Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):67-90.
Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul Churchland - 2003 - In John Heil, Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Personal and sub‐personal; A defence of Dennett's early distinction.Jennifer Hornsby - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):6-24.
What is this thing called 'commonsense psychology'?Lynne Rudder Baker - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):3-19.
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