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Reevaluating scientific progress as a problem resolution
Azafea: Revista de Filosofia 16:133-147 (2014)
Abstract
“Problem-solving” as a criterion of scientific progress defended by Thomas S. Kuhn and Larry Laudan, respectively, has been criticized by several authors. Recently, Alexander Bird has suggested that problem-solving as a criterion of scientific progress is regressive and anti-intuitive. In this text I reassess Kuhn, Laudan and Bird’s positions and I show that Bird’s arguments are untenable.Author's Profile
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References found in this work
A Confutation of Convergent Realism.Larry Laudan - 2001 - In Yuri Balashov & Alex Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 211.
Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism.Larry Laudan - 1987 - American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1):19 - 31.
From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism: On Some Relations Between Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation.Theodorus Antonius Franciscus Kuipers - 2000 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
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