Socratic Method and Socratic Ethics: The Meno

In Plato's Ethics. New York, US: OUP Usa (1995)
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Abstract

The core argument of chapter 9 is the thesis that the epistemological distinction between knowledge and beliefs introduced in the Meno plays a crucial role in the consideration of virtues. Thanks to this distinction, Plato can indeed dismiss the theory according to which virtues are only instrumental. Therefore, it is demonstrated that the theory of virtue of the early dialogues is the result of having knowledge of the importance of virtues but not a proper and true knowledge of them.

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Terence Irwin
Oxford University

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