Structural Realism and Eternalism can solve the mind-brain problem (4th edition)

(ed.)
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Abstract

There are many theories concerning the contemporary mind-brain (mind-body) problem, but these theories are fundamentally flawed because they conceive of the issue as a relationship between “mind” and “matter.” This is problematic because the notion of “matter” in this context presupposes naïve realism, meaning that what is taken as “matter” is in fact merely a phenomenon as it appears to the mind. In other words, the true nature of the mind-brain problem today is actually a problem concerning the relationship between one phenomenon and another phenomenon. The real issue is the relationship between phenomena in the mind and the external reality that represents those phenomena. This paper first re-examines naïve realism, then redefines the mind-body problem as a relationship between the mind and reality, and finally attempts to resolve it by integrating Structural Realism with Eternalism in the philosophy of time. Structural Realism, by reducing “reality” to “scientific description,” can readily explain the identity of mind and brain. Eternalism, by significantly altering the concept of “causality,” also has the potential to resolve the problem of mental causation.

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (127):127-136.
Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.

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