Is 'no' a force-indicator? Sometimes, possibly

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Analysis 72 (2):225-231 (2012)
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Abstract

Some bilateralists have suggested that some of our negative answers to yes-or-no questions are cases of rejection. Mark Textor (2011. Is ‘no’ a force-indicator? No! Analysis 71: 448–56) has recently argued that this suggestion falls prey to a version of the Frege-Geach problem. This note reviews Textor's objection and shows why it fails. We conclude with some brief remarks concerning where we think that future attacks on bilateralism should be directed

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10.1093/analys/ans048

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Luca Incurvati
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Citations of this work

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Bilateralism in Proof-Theoretic Semantics.Nissim Francez - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):239-259.
Supposition: No Problem for Bilateralism.Ryan Simonelli - 2025 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 54 (1):1-21.
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References found in this work

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Spreading the world.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (3):385-387.
Multiple Conclusions.Greg Restall - 2005 - In Petr Hájek, Luis Valdés-Villanueva & Dag Westerståhl, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress. College Publications.
Formalization of logic.Rudolf Carnap - 1943 - Cambridge: Harvard university press.
Yes and no.I. Rumfitt - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):781-823.

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