Husserl’s Phenomenological Standpoint

Journal of Philosophical Research 33:263-270 (2008)
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Abstract

Husserl’s phenomenology is not an attempt to answer questions about contingent fact and existence. Rather, it is an attempt to specify conceptual truths about phenomena. In particular, it takes no stand on the existence of other minds. Thus, any interpretation of Husserl’s answer to the problem of intersubjectivity as affirming the existence of other minds is mistaken.

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Peter Hutcheson
Texas State University

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References found in this work

Formal and transcendental logic.Edmund Husserl - 1969 - The Hague,: Martinus Nijhoff.
Ideas.Edmund Husserl - 1969 - New York,: Humanities P..
Ideas.Edmund Husserl - 1931 - New York,: Routledge. Edited by William Ralph Boyce Gibson.
Husserl's Problem of Intersubjectivity.Peter Hutcheson - 1980 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 11 (2):144-162.

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