Soames and widescopism

Philosophical Studies 123 (3):231 - 241 (2005)
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Abstract

Widescopism, as I call it, holds that names are synonymous with descriptions that are required to take wide scope over modal adverbs. Scott Soames has recently argued that Widescopism is false. He identifies an argument that is valid but which, he claims, a defender of Widescopism must say has true premises and a false conclusion. I argue, first, that a defender of Widescopism need not in fact say that the target arguments conclusion is false. Soames argument that she must confuses, I claim, modal adverbs and modal predicates. I then argue that even if she did reject the conclusion, she could nonetheless hold that the target arguments first premise is ambiguous as between a true reading, on which the argument is invalid, and a false reading, on which the argument is valid. I conclude that Soames argument against Widescopism fails.

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David Hunter
Toronto Metropolitan University

Citations of this work

Rigid designators.Joseph LaPorte - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Against widescopism.Ben Caplan - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (2):167-190.
Recent Defenses of Descriptivism.Anthony Everett - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (1):103-139.
On sense and direct reference.Ben Caplan - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):171-185.

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul Aaron Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Naming and necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kolbel, Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2003 - In John Heil, Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.

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