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Smiley's distinction between rules of inference and rules of proof
In Jonathan Lear & Alex Oliver, The Force of Argument: Essays in Honor of Timothy Smiley. Routledge. pp. 107--126 (2015)
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Citations of this work
Non-Boolean classical relevant logics II: Classicality through truth-constants.Tore Fjetland Øgaard - 2021 - Synthese (3-4):1-33.
A Substructural Approach to Explicit Modal Logic.Shawn Standefer - 2023 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 32 (2):333–362.
Naive Modus Ponens and Failure of Transitivity.Andreas Fjellstad - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (1):65-72.
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