Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness

In Self-Awareness and The Elusive Subject. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 84-118 (2023)
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Abstract

While we can explicitly reflect upon ourselves and our mental states, we often don’t. It would be odd to walk around thinking “I am thinking.” Nevertheless, it seems that there is a sense that even when we are engaged in unreflective tasks we know we are conscious. There is, according to many philosophers, a pre-reflective self-consciousness that ultimately underwrites our moments of explicit self-consciousness. Consciousness is, in some sense, always self-consciousness. Chapter 5 considers the nature of pre-reflective self-consciousness and considers an argument for its existence. It is argued that while there is pre-reflective self-consciousness it doesn’t introduce extra complexity into the structure of consciousness. Instead, there is a deflationary account of pre-reflective self-consciousness that is consistent with the elusiveness of the subject and the anonymous character of conscious experiences.

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Author's Profile

Robert Howell
Southern Methodist University

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by John McDowell.
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred I. Dretske - 1981 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (1):69-70.
Transparency and Self-Knowledge.Alex Byrne - 2018 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

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