Lehrer's case against foundationalism

Erkenntnis 60 (1):51-73 (2004)
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Abstract

In this essay, I assess Keith Lehrer's case against Foundationalism, which consists of variations on three objections: The Independent Information or Belief Objection, The Risk of Error Objection, and the Hidden Argument Objection. I conclude that each objection fails for reasons that can be endorsed – indeed, I would say for reasons that should be endorsed – by antifoundationalists and foundationalists alike.

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Daniel Howard-Snyder
Western Washington University

References found in this work

Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1990 - Boulder, Colo.: Routledge.
Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1974 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Epistemic Justification.Nicholas Everitt - 2001 - Mind 112 (447):572-575.
Knowledge.K. Lehrer - 1974 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 38 (2):326-327.

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