How Pseudo-hypotheses Defeat a Non-Bayesian Theory of Evidence: Reply to Bandyopadhyay, Taper, and Brittan

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):299-306 (2016)
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Abstract

Bandyopadhyay, Taper, and Brittan advance a measure of evidential support that first appeared in the statistical and philosophical literature four decades ago and have been extensively discussed since. I have argued elsewhere, however, that it is vulnerable to a simple counterexample. BTB claim that the counterexample is flawed because it conflates evidence with confirmation. In this reply, I argue that the counterexample stands, and is fatal to their theory.

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Colin Howson
Last affiliation: London School of Economics

Citations of this work

Likelihoodism and Guidance for Belief.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (4):501-517.

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