Abstract

Epiphenomenalism consists of three claims: mental events are irreducibly distinct from physical events; each mental event is dependent both for its existence and for its properties on physical events; no mental event exerts any causal influence either on other mental events or on physical events. The first claim identifies epiphenomenalism as a dualistic theory, which is a source of both strength and weakness. The second and third claims taken together assert the complete dependence of the mental on the physical and thus amount to commitment to the autonomy of physical operations. The mental, while conceded an ontologically irreducible status, is said to be causally impotent. The physical is identified as its indispensable causal ground. At the same time, whatever occurs within the human body is asserted to be fully explicable by reference to antecedent physical events and the laws that relate them. It is his commitment to the autonomy of the physical that allows the epiphenomenalist to welcome the findings of modern science. At the same time, this autonomy of the physical and the consequent potential adequacy of science to physical fact are not thought to compel surrender of a dualist ontology.