Responsibility for Killer Robots

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (3):731-747 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Future weapons will make life-or-death decisions without a human in the loop. When such weapons inflict unwarranted harm, no one appears to be responsible. There seems to be a responsibility gap. I first reconstruct the argument for such responsibility gaps to then argue that this argument is not sound. The argument assumes that commanders have no control over whether autonomous weapons inflict harm. I argue against this assumption. Although this investigation concerns a specific case of autonomous weapons systems, I take steps towards vindicating the more general idea that superiors can be morally responsible in virtue of being in command.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Autonomous Weapons and Distributed Responsibility.Marcus Schulzke - 2013 - Philosophy and Technology 26 (2):203-219.
Just War and Robots’ Killings.Thomas W. Simpson & Vincent C. Müller - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):302-22.
Autonomous Weapons and the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence.Peter Asaro - 2020 - In S. Matthew Liao, Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 212-236.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-06-11

Downloads
361 (#129,105)

6 months
51 (#168,765)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Johannes Himmelreich
Syracuse University

References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Group agency: the possibility, design, and status of corporate agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Philip Pettit.
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

View all 47 references / Add more references