Impossibility Results for Infinite-Electorate Abstract Aggregation Rules

Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):273-286 (2012)
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Abstract

Following Lauwers and Van Liedekerke (1995), this paper explores in a model-theoretic framework the relation between Arrovian aggregation rules and ultraproducts, in order to investigate a source of impossibility results for the case of an infinite number of individuals and an aggregation rule based on a free ultrafilter of decisive coalitions.

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References found in this work

Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Kenneth Joseph Arrow - 1951 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley: New York.
Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
Judgment aggregation: a survey.Christian List & Clemens Puppe - 2009 - In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe, Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Philippe Mongin - 2010 - Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2):562-582.

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