A Counterexample to A

Philosophia 42 (2):387-389 (2014)
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Abstract

The Direct Argument is an important argument for demonstrating that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism because it makes no presuppositions about the nature of free will. One of the inference rules employed in the Direct Argument is rule A: If a proposition is broadly logically necessary, then it is true and no one is, nor ever has been, even partially morally responsible for the fact that the proposition is true. While inference rule A is assumed by all parties to the debate, I demonstrate that the rule is invalid

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Author's Profile

Charles Hermes
University of Texas at Arlington

References found in this work

An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Truthmakers, entailment and necessity.Greg Restall - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):331 – 340.
Responsibility for necessities.Stephen Kearns - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):307-324.
Truthmakers and the Direct Argument.Charles Hermes - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (2):401-418.
Transfer principles and moral responsibility.Eleonore Stump & John Martin Fischer - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):47-56.

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