Abstract

Assuming some beliefs are actually undesirable, are we responsible for the undesirable beliefs we hold? This depends on whether we are responsible for beliefs simpliciter. While epistemic involuntarists deny responsibility, other epistemologists seek to maintain it. A variety of tactics have been used to salvage epistemic responsibility, but the most promising of these focuses on affecting belief formation. Beliefs may be involuntary, but we can influence the sorts of beliefs we adopt, and we are certainly answerable for the reasons we have for our beliefs—although those reasons will reflect our epistemic communities and frameworks. A problem, however, lies in knowing when to trust our reasons and when to challenge them. The decentering of epistemic authority away from the individual and toward society makes it more difficult to account for epistemic responsibility, especially for individuals who are immersed in communities that collectively, systemically hold undesirable beliefs. Of course, communal agency is no simple concept, further muddying the waters surrounding epistemic responsibility. Still, joint epistemic action seems not only possible but something useful for helping us understand how we arrive at the beliefs we do—and how we are responsible for these ways in which we come to hold beliefs.