Abstract

I pursue two objectives in my dissertation: the articulation and the evaluation of Frege's theory of knowledge. I disagree with the generally held view that Frege is concerned primarily with a theory of meaning and with technical problems in mathematics. I show that Frege is concerned with articulating an objectivist theory of knowledge. I consider Frege a Neo-Kantian thinker and therefore locate him within the Neo-Kantian tradition in epistemology. Frege argues that epistemology, conceived as the study of knowledge, is a normative discipline and should be pursued in an a priori manner. I demonstrate that Frege rejects all subjectivistic and empirical theories of knowledge. These approaches to epistemology are contaminated by psychologism in virtue of the fact that they make appeals to psychology and to the empirical. In epistemology, psychologism holds that claims to knowledge can be justified relative to the subjective psychological states of individuals. Frege views all psychologistic theories of knowledge as relativistic, as rendering all epistemic concepts worthless and meaningless, and as making possible radical and dogmatic forms of subjectivism and skepticism. Frege defends the normativity of epistemology against empirical intrusions. For Frege logic, the normative discipline that is concerned with how we ought to think, is the ground for any theory of knowledge. As such, it will make the logical justification of objective knowledge possible and will serve as the basis for an objectivistic epistemology. My second objective is to evaluate Frege's epistemology and to consider whether Frege offers any cogent arguments to prove why his theory is a correct theory of knowledge. Are there good reasons for agreeing with Frege that psychology has no place in epistemology? Does the naturalization of epistemology entail a rejection of traditional epistemology? I conclude by presenting what I take to be a plausible naturalized approach to epistemology