Why Temporary Properties Are Not Relations Be- tween Physical Objects and Times

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):211–216 (1998)
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Abstract

Take this banana. It is now yellow, and when I bought it yesterday it was green. How can a single object be both green all over and yellow all over without contradiction? It is, of course, the passage of time which dissolves the contradiction, but how is this possible? How can a banana ripen? These questions raise the problem of change. The problem is sometimes called the problem of temporary intrinsics, but, as I shall explain below, this emphasis on intrinsic properties is misleading. For my more recent thoughts in this area, please see my 'David Lewis on Persistence' (2015).

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Katherine Hawley
PhD: Cambridge University; Last affiliation: University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

Persistence through time.Sally Haslanger - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman, The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 315--354.
The Experience of Temporal Passage.Akiko Monika Frischhut - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Geneva and University of Glasgow
Time for Bergmann’s Bare Particulars.Ernâni Magalhães - 2007 - In Laird Addis, Greg Jesson & Erwin Tegtmeier, Ontology and Analysis: Essays and Recollection about Gustav Bergmann. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 123-132.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 2001 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics.Sally Haslanger - 1989 - Analysis 49 (3):119-125.
Parthood and identity across time.Judith Thomson - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):201-220.

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