Mind in society: Where the action is?

Abstract

In his chapter titled "Consciousness, Charles Taylor suggests that the traditional mind/body, mental/physical dichotomy is an undesirable legacy of the seventeenth century. Its faults are that it gives rise to a dualism that must then be resolved in various unsatisfactory ways. The most prevalent of these ways is currently "functionalism," which explains cognition in terms of functional states and processes like those of a computer and "marginalizes" (i.e., minimizes or denies completely the causal role of) consciousness. The alternative, "interactionism," gives due weight to consciousness but at the cost of adding an independent domain to the physical one, namely, the mental, and possibly tampering indeterminately with physics thereby.

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Stevan Harnad
McGill University

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