Moral explanations of natural facts – can moral claims be tested against moral reality?

Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):57-68 (1986)
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reprint Harman, Gilbert (2010) "Moral Explanations of Natural Facts—Can Moral Claims Be Tested Against Moral Reality?". Southern Journal of Philosophy 24(S1):57-68

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Gilbert Harman
Princeton University

Citations of this work

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Thick Ethical Concepts.Pekka Väyrynen - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Moral Perception.Andrew Cullison - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):159-175.

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