Institutional objects, reductionism and theories of persistence

Dialectica 68 (4):525-562 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Can institutional objects be identified with physical objects that have been ascribed status functions, as advocated by John Searle in The Construction of Social Reality (1995)? The paper argues that the prospects of this identification hinge on how objects persist – i.e., whether they endure, perdure or exdure through time. This important connection between reductive identification and mode of persistence has been largely ignored in the literature on social ontology thus far.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-09

Downloads
353 (#131,131)

6 months
58 (#152,556)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

The Identity of Social Groups.Kit Fine - 2020 - Metaphysics 3 (1):81-91.
Social Mereology.Katherine Hawley - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (4):395-411.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 2001 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Rogers Searle - 1969 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul Aaron Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.

View all 143 references / Add more references