Abstract

Georg Friedrich Meier’s approach to prejudice in 18th century German philosophy represents a significant departure from the typical views of the Enlightenment, which often regarded prejudice as a logical or psychological obstacle to knowledge. The philosophy of Christian Wolff, which was prevalent during this period, emphasized that knowledge should be clear, distinct, and well-ordered, with prejudice seen as an error to be eradicated through rigorous scientific methods. However, Meier, while aligned with Wolffian logic, challenged this view by reassessing the role of prejudice. He argued that while prejudice should be avoided in philosophical and scientific reasoning, it is an unavoidable aspect of common knowledge shaped by unexamined beliefs and early experiences. Meier suggested that prejudice, although a negative element of knowledge, may play a more complex role in human understanding. His view reflects a more cautious and humble attitude towards human reason, recognizing its inherent limitations and the challenge of achieving absolute clarity in every realm of knowledge.