Are pains necessarily unpleasant?

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):643-59 (1989)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.2307/2107852

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Can Evaluativism about unpleasant pains meet the normative condition?Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (7):779-802.
Pains that Don't Hurt.David Bain - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):305-320.
Explaining the privacy of afterimages and pains.Edward Averill - 1978 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (March):299-314.
On the alleged evidence for non-unpleasant pains.Thomas Park - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):738-756.
Towards Affective-Evaluativism: the Intentional Structure of Unpleasant Pain Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly (2):693-717.
Independence and Connections of Pain and Suffering.S. Benjamin Fink - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):46-66.
Is pain necessarily unpleasant: a look at the curious case of pain asymbolia through the evaluativist, pure imperativist, and intensive theories of pain.Sean Michael Dana Carrothers - unknown
When Pain Isn't Painful.David Bain - 2015 - The Philosophers' Magazine 3:34-41.
What makes pains unpleasant?D. T. Bain - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
The Imperative View of Pain.David Bain - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):164-85.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
226 (#179,724)

6 months
31 (#285,230)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
What makes pains unpleasant?D. T. Bain - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
The distinctive feeling theory of pleasure.Ben Bramble - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
The reduction of sensory pleasure to desire.Chris Heathwood - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):23-44.
Pain.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 72 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references