- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Social Knowledge and Social Norms
In Markos Valaris & Stephen Hetherington, Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing. pp. 111-138 (2018)
Abstract
Social knowledge, for the most part, is knowledge through testimony. This essay is an overview of the epistemology of testimony. The essay separates knowledge from justification, characterizes testimony as a source of belief, explains why testimony is a source of knowledge, canvasses arguments for anti-reductionism and for reductionism in the reductionism vs. anti-reductionism debate, addresses counterexamples to knowledge transmission, defends a safe basis account of testimonial knowledge, and turns to social norms as a partial explanation for the reliability of testimony.Author's Profile
Other Versions
No versions found
Links
PhilArchive
External links
(no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver
- Configure custom resolver
My notes
Similar books and articles
On the Possibility of Knowledge through Unsafe Testimony.B. J. C. Madison - 2020 - Social Epistemology 34 (5):513-526.
Epistemic buck-passing and the interpersonal view of testimony.Judith Baker & Philip Clark - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):178-199.
A Critique of Reductionism and Non‐Reductionism.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - In Learning from words: testimony as a source of knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 141-175.
Knowing at Second Hand.Benjamin McMyler - 2011 - In Testimony, Trust, and Authority. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 45-76.
Does anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony imply interest relativism about knowledge attributions?John Greco - 2021 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 66 (1):e41472.
Trust and the Transmission of Knowledge.Paul Faulkner - 2011 - In Knowledge on Trust. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 53-78.
Counterexamples to Testimonial Transmission.Peter Graham & Zachary Bachman - 2019 - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Pedersen, The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 61-77.
Analytics
Added to PP
2020-10-08
Downloads
1,265 (#37,778)
6 months
190 (#63,136)
2020-10-08
Downloads
1,265 (#37,778)
6 months
190 (#63,136)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
The Function of Assertion and Social Norms.Peter Graham - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg, The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 727-748.
References found in this work
Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms.Cristina Bicchieri - 2016 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Try MATCHA Writer if you're interested in citing directly from PhilPapers and certifying your authorship.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation