Divergence Arguments in Collective Epistemology

Philosophy Compass 20 (6):e70045 (2025)
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Abstract

Many have argued that the lives of groups and their members may diverge. For example, that groups can believe or know propositions that none of their members know or believe. This article gives an overview of a prominent type of argument, called divergence argument, which aims to support this view. In particular, the article will work out a conceptual map that enables us to discuss underlying theoretical assumptions and categorise different types of divergence arguments as well as the potential objections they face.

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Author Profiles

Simon Graf
LMU Munich
Haixin Dang
Case Western Reserve University

Citations of this work

Summativism and non-summativism about groups.Haixin Dang - 2026 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):1522-1532.
Generic Epistemology.Graf Simon - 2026 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 13.
Fiabilismo Robusto de virtudes colectivas.Dani Pino - 2026 - Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía 53:169-202.

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References found in this work

Quotation.Herman Cappelen, Ernest Lepore & Matthew McKeever - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Group agency: the possibility, design, and status of corporate agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Philip Pettit.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 2008 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Conflict of Interest.Henk ten Have & Maria do Céu Patrão Neves - 2021 - In Henk ten Have & Maria do Céu Patrão Neves, Dictionary of Global Bioethics. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 345-346.

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