Abstract

On a Fregean view of communication, communication requires shared sense. On a Russellian view of communication, it requires only shared reference and fulfillment of what I will call transactional requirements. My first aim is to illustrate that the Fregean view is dialectically unstable, for reasons not usually discussed: the Fregean must explain some failures of communication in terms of difference of sense, and others in terms of failure to meet transactional requirements, without a satisfying explanation of the difference. The Russellian account is general and principled by contrast. However, even among those who shy away from a Fregean view of communication, hesitation to embrace a Russellian view is common, so my second aim is to ask whether this hesitation is justified. I do so, by clarifying the relationship between Russelianism about communication and relationism about communication—a view which may seem to provide a third option. I’ll suggest a way to adjudicate between these two views, by clarifying a commitment shared by the Fregean and the relationist, but rejected by the Russellian. If this commitment is justified, then given the instability of the Fregean view, relationism is preferable. However, the upshot of the discussion may rather be that traditional dissatisfaction with a Russellian view of communication is undermotivated.