Telling Propaganda from Legitimate Political Persuasion

Episteme 20 (3):778-797 (2023)
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Abstract

How does propaganda differ from the legitimate persuasive practices that animate a healthy democracy? The question is especially salient as digital technologies facilitate new modes of political persuasion and the public square saturates with information factual and fabricated alike. In answer, we propose a typology based on the rhetorical strategies that propaganda and its legitimate counterpart each employ. We argue that the point of contrast between the phenomena turns on two key features: whether the rhetorical strategy sufficiently engages our deliberative capacities, and whether it runs counter to our epistemic interests. While in practice the boundary between the concepts is not always sharp, the account identifies a set of conceptual tools that help better frame and come to grips with propaganda and legitimate political persuasion in an information-dense and increasingly complex media landscape.

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Gloria Origgi
Institut Jean Nicod

References found in this work

Trustworthiness.Karen Jones - 2012 - Ethics 123 (1):61-85.
Rational Persuasion as Paternalism.George Tsai - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (1):78-112.
Persuasion and Epistemic Paternalism.Robin McKenna - 2020 - In Amiel Bernal & Guy Axtell, Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications. Lanham, Md: Rowman & LIttlefield. pp. 91-106.
Bullshit, Post-truth, and Propaganda.Quassim Cassam - 2021 - In Elizabeth Edenberg & Michael Hannon, Political Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 49-63.

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