G. E. Moore and theory of moral/right action in ethics of social consequences

Ethics and Bioethics (in Central Europe) 7 (1-2):57-65 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

G. E. Moore’s critical analysis of right action in utilitarian ethics and his consequentialist concept of right action is a starting point for a theory of moral/right action in ethics of social consequences. The terms right and wrong have different meanings in these theories. The author explores different aspects of right and wrong actions in ethics of social consequences and compares them with Moore’s ideas. He positively evaluates Moore’s contributions to the development his theory of moral/right action.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-12-14

Downloads
1,534 (#26,572)

6 months
267 (#29,462)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Vasil Gluchman
Comenius University In Bratislava (Doctorate)

References found in this work

Rights and agency.Amartya Sen - 1982 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (1):3-39.
Utilitarianism and welfarism.Amartya Sen - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (9):463-489.
Consequentialism.Philip Pettit - 1991 - Dartmouth Publishing Company.
The Consequentialist Perspective.Philip Pettit - 1997 - In Marcia W. Baron, Philip Pettit & Michael A. Slote, Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.

View all 29 references / Add more references