Are beliefs a matter of taste? A case for Objective Imprecise Information

Theory and Decision 71 (1):23-32 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We argue, in the spirit of some of Jean-Yves Jaffray's work, that explicitly incorporating the information, however imprecise, available to the decision maker is relevant, feasible, and fruitful. In particular, we show that it can lead us to know whether the decision maker has wrong beliefs and whether it matters or not, that it makes it possible to better model and analyze how the decision maker takes into account new information, even when this information is not an event and finally that it is crucial when attempting to identify and measure the decision maker's attitude toward imprecise information

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-01

Downloads
276 (#153,870)

6 months
12 (#969,130)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Ellsberg games.Frank Riedel & Linda Sass - 2014 - Theory and Decision 76 (4):469-509.

Add more citations