Network stability and consciousness?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):155-156 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness needs to disambiguate its criteria for identifying the relevant vehicles. Moreover, a vehicle theory may appear entirely arbitrary in sorting between what are typically thought of as conscious and unconscious processes.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Stability is not intrinsic.D. C. Dennett & C. F. Westbury - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):153-154.
Putting content into a vehicle theory of consciousness.Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):175-196.
A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience.Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.
Constructing consciousness.Gezinus Wolters & R. Hans Phaf - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):174-174.
What, exactly, is explicitness?Hugh Clapin - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):150-151.
Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness.Max Velmans - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):172-173.
Vehicles, processes, and neo-classical revival.Robert Van Gulick - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):170-171.
Vehicle, process, and hybrid theories of consciousness.Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):303-305.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
120 (#390,143)

6 months
28 (#328,355)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Daniel Gilman
University of Chicago

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references