Rational Credence and the Value of Truth

In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne, Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 2. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2007)
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reprint Gibbard, Allan (2008) "Rational Credence and the Value of Truth". Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2():143-164
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Allan Gibbard
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Citations of this work

Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 263-297.
Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.

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References found in this work

Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2011 - In Antony Eagle, Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.
A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.
How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.

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