Normative strength and the balance of reasons

Philosophical Review 116 (4):533-562 (2007)
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10.1215/00318108-2007-013

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Joshua Gert
College of William and Mary

Citations of this work

Weighing Reasons.Chris Tucker - 2025 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Understanding standing: permission to deflect reasons.Ori Herstein - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3109-3132.

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References found in this work

Skepticism about practical reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.
An unconnected Heap of duties?David McNaughton - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):433-447.
Unprincipled Ethics.David McNaughton & Piers Rawling - 2000 - In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little, Moral particularism. New York: Oxford University Press.

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